Introduction by Suski, Emily F.
Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice
Volume 35 | Issue 2 Article 2
May 2015
A Forgiveness Law: The Path to Solve the Peace
Versus Justice Dilemma
Juan Carlos Portilla
Boston College Law School, juan.portilla@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/jlsj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Human Rights Law
Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War and Peace Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Juan Carlos Portilla, A Forgiveness Law: The Path to Solve the Peace Versus Justice Dilemma, 35 B.C.J.L.
& Soc. Just. 193 (2015), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/jlsj/vol35/iss2/2
  193 
A FORGIVENESS LAW: THE PATH TO 
SOLVE THE PEACE VERSUS  
JUSTICE DILEMMA 
JUAN CARLOS PORTILLA* 
Abstract: The peace process between the Colombian government and the Co-
lombian guerrillas provides a case study to examine the operation of a for-
giveness law under international law. In 2012, the Colombian Congress passed a 
legal framework for peace, which essentially provided amnesty for those accused 
of international crimes. While amnesty trades justice for peace, the forgiveness 
law proposal for Colombia would secure justice and peace together. Unlike am-
nesty, the forgiveness law proposal is lawful under international law, for it guar-
antees prosecution of international crimes, discovery of the truth, a fair trial, ad-
judication of individual criminal responsibility, redress for victims, guarantees of 
non-repetition, and mercy for perpetrators. Under the proposal, victims—through 
a forgiveness and reconciliation commission—actively participate in the legal 
proceedings that lead to the granting of a pardon because the act of forgiveness is 
an individual prerogative that only victims enjoy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Governments of societies in situations of internal armed conflict have 
often used amnesty as a policy tool to negotiate peace with those accused of 
committing international crimes,1 thus trading justice for peace. Yet, amnes-
ties granted to those accused of international crimes are unlawful under inter-
national law2 and exemplify one feature of the “peace versus justice” dilem-
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Rights Committee on behalf of a Venezuelan student activist who was a victim of unlawful deten-
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 1 International crimes are war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other violations 
of international humanitarian law. These crimes fall upon the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) and are known as ICC crimes. 
 2 See Juan Carlos Portilla, Amnesty: Evolving 21st Century Constraints Under International 
Law, 38 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 169, 170–71 (2014); see also Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. 
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ma—a topic of international law that remains unsettled among scholars. 3 
Nevertheless, societies emerging from a civil war must debate public policies 
upon which a solid transition from conflict into peace can be constructed 
without contravening international law.4 One of the facets of such a transition 
must be a forgiveness law,5 which can help these societies achieve reconcilia-
tion without impunity, and which provides a permanent solution to the di-
lemma of peace versus justice. 
The peace process between the Colombian government and the Revolu-
tionary Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (“FARC”)6 offers an opportuni-
ty to examine the lawfulness of a forgiveness law under international law, and 
to show how such a law could better service the dual goals of peace and jus-
tice. To facilitate the commencement of such peace talks, the Colombian 
Congress passed a legal framework for peace in July 2012, which grants 
Congress the power to select the individuals to be prosecuted and to deter-
mine whether legal proceedings should be suspended for those non-state ac-
tors accused of international crimes who consent to demobilize as well as for 
those members of armed forces accused of international crimes.7 The powers 
that the legal framework for peace granted to Congress, however, essentially 
provided for an indirect amnesty, which contravenes international law, im-
pedes criminal prosecution, compromises the truth, deprives victims of the 
opportunity to seek redress, and endangers the guarantee of non-repetition 
value. 
                                                                                                                           
Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 154, ¶ 129 (Sept. 26, 2006) (stating that Chile, “violated its obligation to modify its domes-
tic legislation in order to guarantee the rights embodied in the American Convention because it 
has enforced and still keeps in force Decree Law No. 2.191, which does not exclude crimes 
against humanity from the general amnesty it grants”). 
 3 See, e.g., Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Plural-
ism, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 
801–04 (2005). 
 4 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 451 (2003) (advocating estab-
lishments of truth commissions with powers to issue pardons to low- or mid-level perpetrators 
accused of international crimes). 
 5 A definition of a forgiveness law will be given in Part II of this Article. 
 6 The government of Colombia invited FARC to negotiate peace in order to end the country’s 
armed conflict. Negotiations started in Cuba in November in 2012. FARC is one of the non-state 
actor parties to the Colombian conflict, which, according to the Office of the Prosecutor of Interna-
tional Criminal Court, is believed to have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in 
Colombia. See Situation in Colombia, Interim Report, 2012 I.C.J. 2–3, ¶ 2–9 (Nov.), available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otp_-_colombia_-_public_interim_report_-_november_2012.pdf. 
 7 FELIPE GÓMEZ ISA, NORWEGIAN PEACEBUILDING RES. CTR., JUSTICE, TRUTH AND REPA-
RATION IN THE COLOMBIAN PEACE PROCESS 2 (2013), available at http://peacebuilding.no/var/
ezflow_site/storage/original/application/5e7c839d7cf77846086b6065c72d13c5.pdf. 
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Unlike amnesty laws, the forgiveness law proposal for international 
crimes discussed throughout this Article complies with international law,8 for 
it guarantees the prosecution of such crimes,9 the discovery of truth,10 a fair 
trial, 11 redress for victims, 12 and guarantees of non-repetition.13 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                           
 8 This is true in particular, with jus cogens norms of international law, treaty, and customary 
international law, all of which are considered the principal sources of international law under 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties, and Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC Statute”). Judicial decisions of international courts, which have shed light 
on the unlawfulness of amnesties, are part of the corpus of international law as subsidiary sources 
for the determination of the rules of international law. See Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court art. 21, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 91 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties art. 53, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S 331; Statute of the International Court 
of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1(a), (b), (d), Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933. 
 9 There is a duty to prosecute international crimes under international treaty law. Pursuant to 
the Genocide Convention, “[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in 
time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent 
and to punish,” and those accused of the crime of genocide must be prosecuted by a competent 
tribunal of the state within which genocide was perpetrated or by “such international penal tribu-
nal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted 
its jurisdiction.” See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide arts. 
1, 6, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1, 2. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions and their Addi-
tional Protocols, the High Contracting Parties undertake a duty to prosecute those who violate the 
Geneva Conventions’ regime and its Additional Protocols. See Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilians in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter 
Fourth Geneva Convention]; see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 34 [hereinafter 
First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva 
Convention] [collectively referred to as Geneva Conventions]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts art. 85, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. The preamble 
of the Rome Statute states, “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over 
those responsible for international crimes . . . .” See Rome Statute, supra note 8. In addition to 
treaty law, the ICJ has recognized the principle of extraditing or prosecuting those accused of 
having committed the crime of torture. See Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or 
Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment [hereinafter Questions], 2012 I.C.J. 39–40 (July 20). 
 10 See Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, 88 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 245, 245 (2006) (stating that the right to the truth “relates to the obligation of the 
state to provide information to victims or to their families or even society as a whole about the 
circumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights”). 
 11 International human rights treaties protect the right to a fair trial. See International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (Mar. 
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Organization of American States, American Convention on Hu-
man Rights art. 8, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American 
Convention on Human Rights]; European Convention on Human Rights art. 6, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
 12 Human rights treaties recognize the right to an effective remedy and redress. See Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 14, 
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Colombia should instead adopt this method of dealing with post-conflict 
crimes. As governments grant pardons in order to provide a second oppor-
tunity to those convicted of ordinary crimes,14 governments, in the aftermath 
of an internal armed conflict, could similarly issue “pardons as peace” to af-
ford a second opportunity for those involved in the war and convicted of in-
ternational crimes.15 The advantages of a forgiveness law proposal are many, 
and in the future, international organizations such as the United Nations 
should recommend the enactment of a forgiveness law in countries seeking 
peace and reconciliation at the culmination of an internal armed conflict. 
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the background of post-conflict 
societies and the modes of dealing with post-conflict crimes, chiefly interna-
tional crimes. Part II then provides the moral and legal underpinnings of the 
forgiveness law proposal, puts forward the peace and justice equation, and 
suggests the scope and definition of the proposal. Part III makes the case of 
forgiveness over amnesty by evaluating the lawfulness of a forgiveness law 
under international law, and by identifying the advantages of the forgiveness 
law proposal over amnesty. Finally, Part IV examines the possible application 
of the proposal to Colombia by providing background information of the Co-
lombian conflict, suggesting the establishment of a forgiveness and reconcili-
ation commission, providing the structure and power of such a commission, 
and discussing the advantages of the forgiveness and reconciliation proposal 
over the disadvantages of truth commissions with amnesty granting power. 
I. POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES AND THE MODES OF DEALING WITH POST-
CONFLICT CRIMES, CHIEFLY INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
Post-conflict societies are those societies “emerg[ing] from a period of 
mass violence,”16 such as a civil war or a non-international armed conflict 
(“NIAC”),17 in which hostilities occurred between “governmental authorities 
                                                                                                                           
G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, UN Doc. A/39/551 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]; ICCPR, supra 
note 11, art. 2; see also American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 11, at art. 10. 
 13  See Christian J. Tams, Recognizing Guarantees and Assurances of Non-Repetition: 
LaGrand and the Law of State Responsibility, 27 YALE J. INT’L LAW 441, 441–42 (2002). 
 14 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (granting the President power to grant pardons for federal 
crimes in the United States); CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [CONSTITUTION], pt. II, § 62(I) (Spain) 
(granting the King of Spain authority to exercise the right to clemency); Criminal Records Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47, § 2.1 (Can.) (granting Parole Boards power to decide pardons in Canada). 
 15 See Linda Ross Meyer, The Merciful State, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 64, 
68 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007). 
 16 See Richard J. Goldstone, Foreword to MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE, at ix, ix (1998). 
 17 A non-international armed conflict is one which occurs in the “territory of a High Contract-
ing Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups 
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable 
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.” See 
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and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.” 18 
Throughout the twentieth century, the world witnessed the occurrence of 
mass atrocities in all of today’s post-conflict societies. Violence and the per-
petration of international crimes took place all over the world, but in particu-
lar, in Africa (the Rwandan Genocide,19 the apartheid in South Africa,20 war 
crimes during the civil war of Sierra Leone21), in Latin America (Argentina’s 
Dirty War22 and its policy of forced disappearance, the Pinochet torture policy 
era in Chile,23 or the kidnapping and extrajudicial killings policies committed 
in the armed conflict between guerrillas, paramilitary units, and armed forces 
in Colombia,24 which has not yet come to an end), in Southeast Asia (Cam-
bodia25), or in Southeast Europe (the Bosnia and Kosovo Wars in the former 
Yugoslavia26). 
Furthermore, post-conflict societies are viewed as societies moving for-
ward from an era of NIAC into an era of healing, national reconstruction, and 
the rebuilding of national identity.27 These societies confront challenges and 
dilemmas between justice for victims and the achievement of reconciliation 
without impunity. One aspect of these challenges is the mode of dealing with 
post-conflict perpetrators, chiefly perpetrators of international crimes. Judge 
Richard J. Goldstone28 captured the impunity issue that post-conflict societies 
encounter in the aftermath of a NIAC. He stated that: 
                                                                                                                           
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict art. 1, Jun. 8 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinaf-
ter Additional Protocol II]. 
 18 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interloc-
utory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 19 For further reading of the background on the Rwandan genocide, see DAVID LUBAN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 100–04 (2010). 
 20 See MINOW, supra note 16, at 54–55. 
 21 See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 111–18. 
 22 See HURST HANNUM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLI-
CY AND PRACTICE 794 (5th ed. 2011). 
 23 See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 268–79. 
 24 See INFORME GENERAL GRUPO DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA 
HISTÓRICA, ¡BASTA YA! COLOMBIA: MEMORIAS DE GUERRA Y DIGNIDAD 33 (2013), available at 
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/BYColombiaMemor-
iasGuerraDignidadAgosto2014.pdf. 
 25 See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 122–23. 
 26 See id. at 87–90 (providing background on the Balkan Wars). 
 27 See Uwimana Basaninyenzi, From Kigali to Kabul: The Role of Art in Post-Conflict Reconcil-
iation, PEOPLE, SPACES, DELIBERATION, WORLD BANK (Oct. 18, 2012), http://blogs.worldbank.org/
publicsphere/kigali-kabul-role-art-post-conflict-reconciliation (describing national reconstruction efforts 
of Afghanistan). 
 28 Judge Richard J. Goldstone is a former Judge of the South African Constitutional Court and 
former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. 
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[i]t should be recognized that in a perfect society victims are enti-
tled to full justice, namely [a] trial of the perpetrator and, if found 
guilty, adequate punishment. That ideal is not possible in the after-
math of massive violence. There are simply too many victims and 
too many perpetrators. Even the most sophisticated criminal justice 
system would be completely overwhelmed.29 
Although Goldstone gets to the heart of the matter by arguing that jus-
tice for victims of international crimes “is not possible in the aftermath of 
massive violence,”30 there have been voices suggesting otherwise. For exam-
ple, Antonio Cassese has discussed several modes of dealing with interna-
tional crimes in post-conflict societies and has outlined options, such as na-
tional courts exercising jurisdiction on the basis of principles of territoriality 
and nationality, local judicial systems exercising universal jurisdiction to 
prosecute international crimes committed abroad, and establishing interna-
tional criminal tribunals and truth commissions with amnesty-granting pow-
er.31 
The options that Cassese outlines, however, have weaknesses. There are 
two major flaws in the normal mode of dealing with international crimes in 
post-conflict societies, which consist of bringing alleged perpetrators before 
either the national criminal courts of the state where the atrocities occurred or 
before the national criminal system of the nationality of the accused.32 Firstly, 
criminal prosecutions against perpetrators of international crimes entitle only 
redistributive justice. The approach to deal with such perpetrators in post-
conflict societies must focus not only on criminal prosecutions (redistributive 
justice), but also on compensation for victims for all damages suffered by the 
atrocities (restorative justice). Secondly, history has shown that senior state 
officials have been involved in the atrocities that occurred in today’s post-
conflict societies. Therefore, national governments could be tempted not to 
prosecute their own officers by granting them amnesty (self-amnesty), as 
would be the case under the Colombian framework for peace.33 
Although the establishment of universal criminal jurisdiction by national 
governments to prosecute international crimes committed abroad “on behalf 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Goldstone, supra note 16, at ix–x. 
 30 See id. at ix. 
 31 See CASSESE, supra note 4, at 6–10. 
 32 See id. at 6. 
 33 Human rights advocates indicate that the Colombian legal framework for peace could be 
used by the Colombian Congress to provide immunity to government officials, in particular par-
liamentarians and military officials, involved in the killing of thousands of civilians. See Hasan 
Dodwell, Analysis: Legal Framework for Peace, JUST. FOR COLOM., (July 28, 2012), http://www.
justiceforcolombia.org/news/article/1274/analysis-legal-framework- for-peace. 
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of the international community at large”34 has been vividly discussed among 
scholars35 and has been pursued by some states,36 it is not clear if that option 
is totally grounded under international law. Firstly, the prosecutorial state “has 
no links of territory with the offense, or of nationality with the offender (or 
even the victim).”37And secondly, universal jurisdiction represents “a unilat-
eral assertion of domestic jurisdiction subject to no established rules or prin-
ciples (including the particular offenses to which it can be applied).”38 
The United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter has established international criminal tribunals as “[a]nother way of 
reacting to atrocities . . . .”39 Chiefly, the UN Security Council issued resolu-
tions to adopt statutes for international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia40 and 
Rwanda.41 Although the creation of these tribunals by UN Security Council 
resolutions have represented an important step forward in the development of 
international criminal law, there have been critiques to such a response to 
mass violence. For example, these tribunals were not created by treaty, and a 
major issue on the establishment of the tribunals concerned the basis on 
which the Security Council had “the authority to establish an international 
tribunal.”42 In addition, voices have indicated that the tribunals have spent 
millions of dollars “prosecuting a small number of offenders,” and that they 
have cost too much.43 Finally, because of the advent of the ICC, it is unlikely 
that in the future, the UN Security Council will establish international crimi-
nal tribunals to deal with international crimes perpetrators from post-conflict 
societies. 
Cassese also contemplates the option of truth commissions with amnesty 
granting power “as a way of reacting to atrocities,” and as “an important al-
ternative option to the ignominy and jeopardy of criminal proceedings.”44 The 
driving force behind truth commission options is, for Cassese, that such bod-
                                                                                                                           
 34 See CASSESE, supra note 4, at 8. 
 35 See, e.g., SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 281–83 (2006); M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contempo-
rary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 136–51 (2001). 
 36 See MURPHY, supra note 35, at 247. Murphy discusses Belgium’s Law Relative to the 
Repression of Serious Violations of the International Conventions of Geneva of August 12, 1949, 
and of the Protocols I and II of June 8, 1997. Id. He states that “[t]he law allowed an individual 
(whether Belgian or not) to file a criminal complaint in a Belgium court against any person for 
international crimes . . . .” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 37 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 404 cmt. 
(1987). 
 38 See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 212. 
 39 CASSESE, supra note 4, at 11. 
 40 See generally S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 41 See generally S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 42 See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 102. 
 43 See id. at 101. 
 44 CASSESE, supra note 4, at 10. 
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ies can help the process of promoting national reconciliation in post-conflict 
societies. Nevertheless, amnesty for international crimes is unlawful under 
international law and deprives victims of their right to seek redress before a 
court of law. 
In contrast to Goldstone, who claims that the ideal of justice is not pos-
sible in the aftermath of an NIAC, and Cassese, who advocates for, among 
other avenues, truth commissions with amnesty granting power, this Article 
instead argues that peace and justice are achievable together in the aftermath 
of an NIAC, and it proposes a forgiveness law for international crimes as an 
alternative legal approach to amnesty upon which a solid transition from con-
flict into peace can be accomplished without impunity and without contraven-
ing international law. 
II. THE FORGIVENESS LAW PROPOSAL: SCOPE, DEFINITION, AND 
UNDERPINNINGS, INCLUDING THE PEACE AND JUSTICE EQUATION 
A. Scope of the Forgiveness Law Proposal for International Crimes 
In order to sketch out the scope of the forgiveness law proposal for in-
ternational crimes, it is relevant to delineate, in a nutshell, some aspects of 
forgiveness for ordinary crimes. The Supreme Court of the United States, for 
example, has shed some light on the issue. In particular, in Burdick v. United 
States, the Court considered whether acceptance, as well as delivery, of a par-
don was essential to its validity, whether the President of the United States 
could exercise pardoning power before conviction, and whether there was a 
distinction between amnesty and pardon.45 
In the Burdick case, a grand jury investigated whether an employee of 
the U.S. Treasury Department leaked information to the press.46 George Bur-
dick, city editor of the New York Tribunal, appeared before the grand jury 
where he was questioned about the leaks, but he refused to reveal the source 
of his information.47 President Woodrow Wilson granted Burdick a pardon, 
but Burdick rejected the pardon and refused to testify.48 Burdick eventually 
was fined and jailed.49 In holding that accepting a pardon is an admission of 
guilt, and that while amnesty overlooks offense, pardon remits punishment, 
the Court reasoned that pardons are “act[s] of grace, proceeding from the 
power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 85 (1915). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 86. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he 
has committed.”50 
Drawing on Burdick, it is reasonable to state that granting a pardon to a 
perpetrator of an international crime, as an act of grace, which “exempts the 
individual, on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a 
crime he has committed,”51requires prosecution52 conviction, and punishment 
of the crime.53 Pardons under Burdick can be given to both those who have 
committed a crime and those who have been convicted, for a pardon “carries 
an imputation of guilt.”54 Likewise, under Burdick there are differences be-
tween amnesty and pardon.55 The Court reasoned that unlike amnesty, a par-
don “remits punishment . . . [and] condones infractions of the peace of the 
State,”56 does not “overlook[] the offense and the offender,”57 and does not 
leave the offense and the offender “in oblivion.”58 
What is more, a pardon is defined as an “act or an instance of officially 
nullifying punishment or other legal consequences of a crime.”59 To be grant-
ed a pardon for an ordinary crime requires punishment, and to secure pun-
ishment a government must prosecute, and the perpetrator must be found 
guilty in accordance with the law. Martha Minow seems to endorse the above 
approach, as she says, “forgiveness does not and should not take the place of 
justice or punishment.” 60  Accountability is necessary, since “[a]dvocating 
punishment for a wrongdoer one has forgiven in fact is well supported by 
reference to the impersonal processes of a justice system . . . .” 61 In other 
words, “[f]orgiveness in this sense need not be a substitute for punishment.”62 
From the statements above, it can be deduced that forgiveness of an in-
ternational crime must be granted only after the prosecution and conviction of 
a perpetrator of such a crime. Forgiveness of an international crime carries an 
imputation of guilt, and such acts of forgiveness must be accepted, since ac-
cepting implies an admission of guilt. Amnesty leaves an international crime 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 89–90 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (1833)). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at 94; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 53 Even though Burdick deals with the commission of an ordinary crime case in the United 
States, the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court can help in the discussion of a forgiveness law for 
international crimes committed in countries confronting the peace versus justice dilemma in the 
wake of an internal armed conflict. 
 54 See Burdick, 236 U.S. at 94. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. at 95. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). 
 60 See MINOW, supra note 16, at 15. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. 
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and the offender in oblivion, and forgiveness must not be a substitute for pun-
ishment of an international crime. 
Furthermore, the act of forgiveness must be an individual prerogative that 
a victim of international crimes enjoys. Aryeh Neier claims that “public for-
giveness in particular runs the risk of signaling to everyone the need to forget,” 
and governments, through their representatives, may end up “usurp[ing] the 
victim’s exclusive right to forgive his oppressor . . . .”63 Consequently, gov-
ernments can “fail to respect fully those who have suffered.”64 Under any 
forgiveness law proposal for international crimes, a victim of these crimes 
must actively participate in the legal proceedings that lead to the granting of a 
pardon for these types of crimes. Thus, a written statement of a victim—in 
which the victim acknowledges the application for a pardon made by his or 
her perpetrator, forgives the offense, accepts the apology, reparation, and the 
guarantee of non-repetition offered—must be a necessary condition that any 
forgiveness law must include in its regime. 
B. Definition of the Forgiveness Law Proposal 
From all of the statements provided above, this Article suggests the fol-
lowing definition of a forgiveness law for international crimes: a statute en-
acted by a legislative branch of government to legally empower victims of 
international crimes with the option of deciding on an act of forgiveness re-
quest made by their perpetrators,65 to provide them with opportunities to seek 
reparation66 and guarantees of non-repetition,67 as well as to afford perpetra-
tors of international crimes an opportunity to seek forgiveness, treatment, 
healing, and a second opportunity to guarantee peaceful co-existence between 
victims and perpetrators in the aftermath of an armed conflict. In this context, 
collective bodies of forgiveness and reconciliation for Colombia must be giv-
en legal authority to grant pardons under a forgiveness law, once prosecu-
tion, 68  the telling of the truth, 69  conviction, sentencing, reparation, 70  and 
guarantees of non-repetition 71  are secured, thus securing peace in post-
conflict societies without contravening international law. 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See id. at 17 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting human rights activist Aryah Neier). 
 64 See id. 
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 67 See Tams, supra note 13, at 441–42. 
 68 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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C. Moral Underpinnings 
Any forgiveness law proposal enacted to facilitate peace and justice 
among warring factions of any society in transition from conflict into peace 
must be based on moral values such as mercy, grace, forgiveness, accounta-
bility, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition. These moral values have 
the support of a wide range of mainstream spiritual teachings, as well as of 
secular moral sources. 
Should vengeance be the moral response to torture, genocide, forced 
disappearance, sexual enslavement, mass killings of civilians, indefinite de-
tention, and other international crimes? Should it be part of the equation for 
solving the peace versus justice dilemma? Lex talionis, rooted in the Code of 
Hammurabi, commands an “eye for [an] eye, tooth for [a] tooth.”72 Under 
Hammurabi, punishments must literally match the crime committed. One of 
the laws of the Code of Hammurabi, for example, states, “If a man bring an 
accusation against a man, and charge him with a [capital] crime, but cannot 
prove it, he, the accuser, shall be put to death.”73 In contrast, Minow asserts 
that, “revenge simply reverses the roles of perpetrator and victim, continuing 
to imprison the victim in horror, degradation, and the bounds of the perpetra-
tor’s violence.”74 
Should grace and forgiveness be the moral response to violence and his-
toric grievances instead of lex talionis? Grace and forgiveness seem to be the 
answer, for they are rooted in the moral teachings of numerous religions of 
the world, all of which emphasis forgiveness—which in turn paves the way to 
peace—instead of lex talionis—which calls for revenge that leads to conflict. 
John Knight, a physician from the Center for Adolescent Substance Abuse 
Research, Children’s Hospital Boston, and Gordon Hugenberger, Seminary 
Professor and Senior Pastor of Park Street Church, say that, “[a]s a universal 
construct, forgiveness is a tenet of many of the world’s great religions.”75 
Christianity provides moral teachings on grace and forgiveness, rather than 
lex talionis. For example, Jesus, in answering to the apostle Peter’s question 
of how many times he had to forgive his brothers, said to Peter, “I tell you, 
not seven times, but seventy-seven times . . . .” 76  Judaism also “instructs 
‘When asked by an offender for forgiveness, one should forgive with a sin-
cere mind and a willing spirit . . . forgiveness is natural to the seed of Isra-
el.’”77 Forgiveness heals the scars of conflict, for Rabbi Harold Kushner ar-
                                                                                                                           
 72 See J. Dyneley Prince, The Code of Hammurabi, 8 AM. J. THEOLOGY 601, 606 (1904). 
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gues that, “victims should forgive not because the other deserves it but be-
cause the victim does not want to turn into a bitter resentful person,”78 as it is 
the case under lex talionis, in which the victim chooses revenge that leads to 
resentment and bitterness. 
East Asian religions, such as Confucianism, also encourage forgiveness 
rather than lex talionis. Confucius once said, “The three hundred poems are 
summed up in the one line, [t]hink no evil.”79 Indian religions, in particular 
Buddhism, teach that “[h]olding on to anger is like grasping a hot coal with 
the intention of throwing it at someone else; you are the one that gets 
burned.”80 In turn, Islam “promises ‘[b]ut if you pardon, and forbear, and for-
give—then, behold, Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.’”81 Given that the world’s 
great religions hold forgiveness as a governing principle and that these reli-
gions guide many of the great powers and developing societies, the for-
giveness law begins from the premise that society must be built on peace, and 
peace comes through forgiveness. Revenge, therefore, cannot be the answer 
to the dilemma of peace versus justice that post-conflict societies confront. 
Rather, forgiveness must be part of the solution and an essential element of 
the peace and justice equation. 
In addition, there are non-religious sources in support of mercy and for-
giveness as a policy tool to achieve peace. In analyzing Seneca’s conception 
of cruelty, Boston College Law Professor Paulo Barrozo suggests that mercy 
is like “an unconditional virtue. No matter how atrocious the deed to be pun-
ished, its agent is to be treated mercifully by the punitive powers.”82 Similar-
ly, Linda Ross Meyer, a Professor of Law, suggests that forgiveness can be 
viewed as “pardons as peace.”83 She suggests that, “Lincoln’s and Johnson’s 
post-Civil War pardons were classic examples of executive pardons as 
peace,” and notes that, Washington, Adams, and Jefferson all used pardon 
power to settle instances of rebellion and to re-form the national communi-
ty.”84 In turn, Minow claims that victims “should not seek revenge and be-
come a new victimizer but instead should forgive the offender and end the 
cycle of offense,” because not a moment should be wasted in grudges or ha-
tred toward the perpetrators.85 It can be inferred from such statements that 
mercy leads to forgiveness, forgiveness leads to individual and collective 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See MINOW, supra note 16, at 19 (citing Rabbi Harold Kushner). 
 79 CONFUCIUS, THE SAYINGS OF CONFUCIUS 4 (Leonard A. Lyall trans., 2d ed. 1925). 
 80 Knight & Hugenberger, supra note 75, at 420. 
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healing, and individual and collective healing leads to individual and collec-
tive peace. 
Although some scholars claim that “[t]he state must be lawful, not mer-
ciful,”86 forgiveness can be used as a policy tool to achieve justice. Meyer 
argues that, “pardons are grounded precisely in the connectedness, embed-
dedness, and finitude that undergird community and government and that 
come before reason and serve as the basis and touchstone for judgments 
about justice that are abstracted in law.”87 Yet, it is important to bring into the 
discussion the variable of accountability. Minow says that, “[e]ven the tradi-
tional Christian call to forgive rather than avenge accompanies faith that 
vengeance will come—through the Divine.”88 But what can be pursued to 
achieve reconciliation instead of waiting for divine justice? According to Mi-
now, contrition and the telling of the truth can “join the effort for reconcilia-
tion.”89 
Finally, the value of reparation and the guarantee of non-repetition play 
critical roles in the effort to achieve both peace and justice. Minow advocates 
that one of the responses to mass atrocities must include “securing reparations 
and apologies for victims.”90 She also states that public policies drafted to 
address reconciliation in societies in conflict must “communicate the aspira-
tion [of] ‘never again.’”91 Acceptance of guilt leads to repentance, and re-
pentance leads to the confession of the truth. The truth leads to reparation and 
the guarantee of “never again,” which in turn pave the way to mercy, grace, 
forgiveness, healing, and peace. The values of mercy, grace, forgiveness, ac-
countability, reparation, and the guarantee of non-repetition that lead to peace 
and justice must thus be embedded in any forgiveness law proposal for post-
conflict societies. 
D. Legal Underpinnings 
Grounded in its moral underpinnings, the act of forgiveness that can lead 
to the granting of a pardon is also deeply rooted in the legal regimes practiced 
around the world on ordinary crimes. The values of mercy, grace, repentance, 
forgiveness, accountability, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition are 
embedded in the pardon regimes of the major legal systems of the world, 
such as the common law and the civil law systems. Reparation92 and guaran-
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tees of non-repetition93 are also rooted in the international legal order, includ-
ing jurisprudence from international judicial bodies and the international trea-
ties.94 Hence, pardoning regimes on ordinary crimes that are rooted in the 
legal systems of the world, as well as the values of reparation and guarantees 
of non-repetition embedded in the international legal order, can guide the dis-
cussion about the legal underpinnings of the proposal for a forgiveness law 
regarding international crimes, which includes the option for victims to carry 
out an act of forgiveness once the prosecution and conviction of their perpe-
trators are accomplished. 
1. The Common Law and Pardons 
The common law system includes a mechanism for pardons once culpa-
bility is established and a guilty individual is convicted. This legal system em-
bodies the moral underpinnings previously discussed. In England, a country 
that follows the common law system, pardoning power for ordinary crimes95 is 
based on mercy and has a royal prerogative genesis.96 In the 1790s, the gover-
nor in the common law country of Australia had the power to grant absolute 
pardons as he, through mercy, emancipated and “discharge[d] from servitude 
and . . . provide[d] a grant of land to some of those prisoners whose conduct 
and work records justified such measures of reward and rehabilitation.”97 
This policy evolved into a conditional pardon called a “ticket-of-leave,” 
which is believed to be the genesis of the parole regimes.98 In the common 
law regime of Canada, while the power of pardon rests with the Parole Board 
of Canada,99 the power of clemency, or the power to grant complete or partial 
remittance of a sentence, rests solely with the Governor-General of Canada or 
the Governor in Council.100 The power of clemency is directly derived from 
the crown and the royal prerogative of mercy.101 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Tams, supra note 13, at 441–42. 
 94 See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at preamble (embracing regime of redistributive and re-
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In the United States, another common law country, pardon regimes em-
brace the values of grace, repentance, and the confession of guilt. At the fed-
eral level, the President of the United States, under Article II, Section 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution, “shall have [p]ower to grant [r]eprieves and [p]ardons for 
[o]ffences against the United States, except in [c]ases of [i]mpeachment.”102 
As previously noted, the U.S. Supreme Court has reasoned that pardons are 
“act[s] of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of 
the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the 
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.”103 
Drawing upon Burdick, it can be said that pardon regimes in the United 
States embrace the value of repentance and acceptance of guilt. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has explained that acknowledgement of guilt is inferred from the 
acceptance of a pardon.104 Acceptance of a pardon carries with it the admit-
tance of guilt, for an individual may deny a pardon, “preferring to be the vic-
tim of the law rather than its acknowledged transgressor—preferring death 
even to such certain infamy.”105 If a convicted criminal is willing to seek or 
accept a pardon, then it follows that such a perpetrator could have gone 
through a mental and spiritual process of repentance and acceptance of guilt. 
On the contrary, if a convicted criminal does not accept a pardon, it can be 
inferred that such a person did not go through a mental and spiritual process 
of repentance and acceptance of guilt because he or she believes in his or her 
innocence. 
2. The Civil Law and Pardons 
Like the common law system, the civil law system also provides for 
pardons and justifies this mechanism along similar moral lines. Some subtle 
differences, however, can be observed among countries with civil law sys-
tems. Under the civil Spanish Constitution of 1978, it is the King of Spain, 
rather than the head of the administration, that holds clemency power and 
who can exercise authority to issue pardons for ordinary crimes.106 On the 
other hand, in France—a civil law system—the pardoning power, which em-
braces the value of reparation, is vested solely in the President of the Repub-
lic.107 Under the French legal system, a victim of an ordinary crime can seek 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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monetary compensation through criminal proceedings as a partie civile108 at 
the criminal trial. If the granting of a pardon comes about, the French legal 
system leaves open the opportunity for victims to pursue reparation for dam-
ages resulting from the criminal offense that has been pardoned.109 In this 
way, the pardon stops only the enforcement of criminal punishments for a 
wrong, while leaving open opportunities for civil reparation. As a result, alt-
hough such a pardon halts the enforcement of a sentence after it has been de-
livered,110 that pardon does not alter the guilt of the individual who has been 
pardoned. 
The value of reparation underlying the pardon system is also embedded 
in the corpus of international law. Human rights treaties recognize the right to 
an effective remedy.111 UN human rights bodies have asserted that, “the right 
to reparation has a dual dimension under international law.”112 The dual di-
mension consists of “(a) a substantive dimension to be translated into the duty 
to provide redress for harm suffered in the form of restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, [and] satisfaction . . . and (b) a procedural dimension as in-
strumental in securing this substantive redress.”113 Jurisprudence from the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has classified reparation into several 
categories: restitution measures,114 rehabilitation measures,115recognition of 
responsibility and apologies,116memorials to honor victims and commemora-
tions, 117  institutional reform, 118  and development programs (housing) for 
communities affected by armed conflict and mass atrocities.119 
Moreover, international law recognizes the value of non-repetition or 
“never again” as a remedy for breaches of the international legal order.120 UN 
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bodies, such as the International Law Commission,121 the International Court 
of Justice (“ICJ”)122 and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (“OHCHR”),123 inter alia, as well as the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights,124 have issued opinions and rendered jurisprudence on the 
guarantee of non-repetition value.125 The International Law Commission, in 
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, asserts that, “a state [that breaches its international obligations] is obli-
gated to offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition” in order to bring 
itself back into compliance.126 The ICJ, in the LaGrand judgment, reasoned 
that a breach of international law entitles “from the breaching state guarantees 
and assurances that the breach will not be repeated,”127 because “an apology 
is not sufficient . . . .”128 
In turn, OHCHR points out that: 
Guarantees of non-repetition is another broad category which in-
cludes institutional reforms tending towards civilian control of mil-
itary and security forces, strengthening judicial independence, the 
protection of human rights workers, human rights training, the 
promotion of international human rights standards in public ser-
vice, law enforcement, the media, industry, and psychological and 
social services.129 
Some scholars have reinforced OHCHR’s assertion and have indicated that a 
fundamental progress in the jurisprudence of some of the regional human 
rights courts has been precisely achieved through the ordering of guarantees 
of non-repetition, “which aim to have a broader social impact and prevent 
repetition of the same type of violations.”130 The Inter-American System of 
Human Rights has embraced the value of the guarantee of non-repetition, or 
“never again.” For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
                                                                                                                           
 121 The UN General Assembly created the International Law Commission in 1947, which is 
responsible for drafting treaties and rules of international law for discussion among UN State 
Members. See G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/174(II) (Nov. 21, 1947). 
 122 The ICJ is the judicial body of the UN. The UN Charter established the Court, which is 
governed by the Charter and its own statute. See U.N. Charter art. 92; Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, supra note 8. 
 123 The UN General Assembly established the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights in 1994. See U.N. G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
 124 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights compose the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 
 125 See Puente, supra note 114, at 70–71. 
 126 See MURPHY, supra note 35, at 184. 
 127 See Tams, supra note 13, at 441. 
 128 LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. No. 104, ¶ 123 (Jun. 27). 
 129 Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 112, at 7–8. 
 130 See Puente, supra note 114, at 79. 
210 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:193 
ordered “measures of non-repetition so as to avoid repetition of similar hu-
man rights violations by the same State . . . .”131 In Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia, 
the Court granted guarantees of non-repetition “based on the general State 
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill Article 1(1) of the American Conven-
tion,”132 which set forth the obligation for State Parties to the Convention to 
“undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure 
to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those 
rights and freedoms, without any discrimination . . . .”133 
From the statements above, it can be concluded that the values embed-
ded in the common law and the civil law systems of mercy, grace, repentance, 
forgiveness, accountability and reparation, and the guarantee of non-
repetition value rooted in the international legal order, must be the underpin-
nings for any forgiveness law for any post-conflict society, including Colom-
bia, in confronting the peace versus justice dilemma. 
E. Putting the Values at Work into the Equation of Peace and Justice 
According to the arguments discussed above, it is feasible to reason that 
if victims of international crimes have mercy and grace for their perpetrators, 
then mercy and grace lead to forgiveness. Forgiveness can lead to healing, 
and healing to individual and collective peace. Concurrently, if perpetrators of 
international crimes accept guilt, then the acceptance of guilt leads to repent-
ance. Repentance can lead to the confession of the truth. With truth come rep-
aration, justice and guarantees of non-repetition, which in turns paves the way 
to mercy, grace, forgiveness, healing and peace. Thus, the Peace and Justice 
Equation below takes these values and puts them together to represent the 
central premise of the forgiveness law proposal. 
1. Clusters of Values 
While victims of international crimes must pursue the values of mercy, 
grace, and forgiveness (victims’ values), perpetrators of international crimes 
must seek the values of acceptance of guilt, repentance, the confession of the 
truth, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition (perpetrators’ values). 
Values Table 
Victims’ Values Cluster: Perpetrators’ Values Cluster: 
Mercy  Accountability  
Grace Acceptance of guilt  
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Forgiveness  Repentance  
Fairness Confession of truth 
Peace Reparation 
 Guarantees of non-repetition 
 Sense of justice  
2. Peace and Justice Equation 
Policy-makers from post-conflict societies can take these clusters of val-
ues and put them together under the Peace and Justice Equation (below). By 
incorporating the Peace and Justice Equation, which represents the central 
premise of any forgiveness law proposal, governments of post-conflict socie-
ties can use the equation as a tool upon which a solid transition from conflict 
into peace can be built without contravening international law. 
Peace and Justice Equation 
Inputs: 
Victims’ Values Cluster  = VVC 
Perpetrators’ Values Cluster = PCV 
Output: 
Peace and Justice   = P J 
 
Resulting Equation: (VCV)  +  (PCV)  =  P J 
III. THE CASE FOR THE FORGIVENESS LAW PROPOSAL OVER AMNESTY 
The forgiveness law proposal has the primary benefit of embracing the 
inputs needed to achieve the output of justice and peace all the while being 
solidly grounded in international law. Unlike amnesty laws, the forgiveness 
law proposal guarantees the following legal elements of crucial relevance for 
international law: prosecution of international crimes;134 the seeking of the 
truth;135 a fair trial136 for perpetrators of these crimes; adjudication of individ-
ual criminal responsibility; redress for victims; 137  guarantees of non-
repetition;138 and mercy for perpetrators. Any forgiveness law that includes and 
assures the fulfillment of these fundamental subjects of law will comply with 
the international legal order, in addition to providing for those convicted of 
international crimes a second opportunity to reintegrate into a society in transi-
tion from conflict into peace. In other words, the forgiveness law proposal is 
consistent with jus cogens norms of international law and relevant treaties. 
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A. Evaluating the Legality of the Forgiveness Law Proposal Under Jus 
Cogens Norms and Relevant Treaties 
If any forgiveness law proposal for post-conflict societies guarantees the 
prosecution of international crimes,139 the seeking of the truth,140 a fair trial141 
for perpetrators of these crimes, adjudication of individual criminal responsi-
bility, redress for victims142 and guarantees of non-repetition,143 then such a 
proposal will be lawful under international law. In order to prove this asser-
tion, it is imperative to address the following questions: Do jus cogens norms 
of international law and relevant treaties require prosecution of international 
crimes? Do jus cogens norms of international law and relevant treaties in-
volve the seeking of the truth in the aftermath of an international armed con-
flict? Do norms of international law protect the right to a fair trial for perpe-
trators of international crimes, the right for victims to seek redress before a 
court of law, and guarantees of non-repetition? In addressing these questions, 
this Article makes the case for the legality of the forgiveness law proposal 
under international law. 
1. Jus Cogens Norms of International Law and Relevant Treaties Require 
Prosecution of International Crimes 
Violations of the jus cogens rules that prohibit slavery, torture, racial 
discrimination, forced disappearance, genocide and aggression, or violation 
of similar treaty law not only entitle but also require the prosecution of such 
violations, either at national or international jurisdictions.144 Jus cogens rules 
are peremptory norms of international law “accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no dero-
gation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.”145 Some legal scholars 
speak of jus cogens rules as immovable “bedrock”146 norms of international 
law. Jurists talk about jus cogens rules as norms pertaining to natural law147 
that are at the top of the hierarchy of international law. Furthermore, it has 
been reasoned that jus cogens norms contain erga omnes148 obligations that 
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fall upon all states of the international community of nations.149 The ICJ has 
held that states have legal interests in protecting basic rights of the human 
person guaranteed by jus cogens.150 For example, it has sustained that state 
parties to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) have the ability, pursuant 
to the Convention, to invoke the responsibility of those state parties that vio-
late the protection against torture embedded in the Convention and to bring 
perpetrators to justice.151 Accordingly, jus cogens can be defined as norms of 
international law that dwell at the top of the international legal order protect-
ing the most fundamental rights of humanity, which are not subject to deroga-
tion by any other legal norm unless they are modified by a succeeding rule of 
international law bearing the same legal status, and which are enforceable 
upon anyone violating them. 
The prohibition against torture stems from these jus cogens rules. For 
the ICJ, “the prohibition of torture is part of customary international law and 
it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens).”152 British Judges denote the 
crime of torture as a “jus cogens crime.”153 Likewise, the prohibitions against 
genocide, racial discrimination, and forced disappearance dwell under the 
same normative principle,154 like the prohibition against torture, and have 
attained the status of jus cogens norms of international law “from which no 
derogation is permitted”155 and from which enforcement actions can be taken 
against those violating them.156 
Violations of jus cogens rules of international law entail prosecution of 
international crimes because treaties, such as CAT, the Genocide Convention 
(“GC”), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC Stat-
ute”), codify the jus cogens prohibitions against torture, genocide, slavery, 
racial discrimination and forced disappearance.157 Under the aut dedere, aut 
judicare principle,158 which means “extradite or prosecute,” and in accord-
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ance with the CAT, perpetrators accused of committing torture must be prose-
cuted by the state party to CAT in which the crime of torture was committed, 
or by another state party to CAT asserting jurisdiction over the crime. 
Under Article 7 of the ICC Statute, the crime of torture amounts to a 
crime against humanity when committed as “part of a widespread or system-
atic attack.”159 It can also be considered a war crime in accordance with Arti-
cle 8 of the ICC Statute.160 State parties to the ICC must prosecute the inter-
national crime of torture when committed as a crime against humanity or 
when committed as a war crime, because “it is the duty of every State to ex-
ercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes.”161 Only if a state party to the ICC is “unwilling or unable”162 to 
prosecute a crime of torture can the ICC then take on a prosecution under Ar-
ticle 17 of the ICC Statute.163 
Pursuant to the GC, perpetrators charged with genocide must be prose-
cuted by the state in which the crime of genocide was executed, or by an in-
ternational criminal tribunal established for that purpose with jurisdiction 
over those contracting parties to the GC that accept the jurisdiction of such a 
tribunal.164 Under the ICC Statute, the ICC is authorized to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the crime of genocide whenever the state is unable or unwilling 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution and the case is of suf-
ficient gravity to justify the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.165 As for en-
slavement and the forced disappearance of people, the ICC Statute codifies 
them as crimes against humanity when committed “as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack.”166 If national prosecutors do not prosecute these two crimes that 
fall upon the jurisdiction of the ICC, William Schabas correctly says that the 
Court can “take on a prosecution only when national justice systems are ‘un-
willing or unable genuinely’ to proceed.”167 From the arguments discussed 
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above, it can be correctly concluded that any violation of the prohibition 
against torture, genocide, slavery and forced disappearance, all of which en-
joy jus cogens status, demand prosecution. 
2. Treaty Law Involves the Seeking of the Truth and the Right of Victims to 
Seek Redress Before a Court of Law 
International treaty law requires that victims have the opportunity to 
prosecute the perpetrators and seek redress for their harm for the following 
reasons. First, human rights treaties in force, such as the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the American Convention on 
Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, guarantee 
victims of gross violations of human rights, such as torture, genocide, forced 
disappearance, and enslavement, among other abuses, the right to legal re-
course and remedy before a court of law.168 Second, the right to legal recourse 
protected by human rights treaties entitles victims the right to seek redress 
and to know the truth. For example, scholars169 argue that the Human Rights 
Committee, established by the ICCPR to monitor compliance with the Cove-
nant, has determined that state parties to the Covenant must prosecute gross 
violations of human rights and must provide compensation to victims of the 
abuses. And third, human rights treaties are enforceable both in times of 
peace and war. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
ascertained that while human rights treaties apply in times of peace, interna-
tional humanitarian law applies in times of armed conflict, and “[m]odern 
international law . . . recognizes that this distinction is inaccurate.”170 It is 
clear, then, that human rights treaties apply in times of war and peace. Hence, 
human rights treaties in force guarantee the right for victims to seek redress 
before a court of law and the seeking of the truth in the aftermath of an inter-
nal armed conflict. 
3. Treaty Law Protects the Right to a Fair Trial for Perpetrators of 
International Crimes 
All human beings accused of committing crimes, whether minor offens-
es, ordinary crimes, or even the most horrendous crimes, such as genocide, 
torture, forced disappearance, or sexual enslavement, deserve the right to a 
fair trial that must be respected during criminal prosecutions. Individual crim-
inal responsibility must be proved in accordance with the law. Since the Nu-
remberg Trials, the right to a fair trial has been included in international 
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agreements. Although International Law Professor William Schabas tells us 
that “during World War II, Churchill and other Allied leaders flirted with the 
idea of some form of summary justice for major war criminals,”171 Robert 
Jackson, a member of the U.S. Supreme Court and one of the chief prosecu-
tors at Nuremberg, expressed that “history would assess the proceedings in 
light of the fairness with which the defendants were treated.”172As a result, 
the Nuremberg Trials secured for its defendants guarantees such as the pre-
sumption of innocence, the right to have legal counsel of choice, to cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence at trial, among other rights.173 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, one of 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals established by the UN Security 
Council,174 ruled that international prosecutions of perpetrators of war crimes 
must guarantee fairness during prosecutions “in full conformity with interna-
tionally recognized human rights instruments.”175 In turn, Article 67 of the 
Rome Statute set forth the rights of those accused of committing international 
crimes.176 Schabas claims that the fair hearing right “established in the cha-
peau of Article 67 of the Statute provides defendants with a powerful tool 
beyond the text of the Statute, and to require that the Court’s respect for the 
rights of an accused keep pace with the progressive development of human 
rights law.”177 Schabas also points out that pursuant to the Rome Statute, “the 
right to a fair hearing applies at all stages of the proceedings, and even during 
the investigation, when no defendant has even been identified.”178 That the 
fairness with which defendants were to be treated, exemplified by Jackson’s 
idea on how to conduct prosecutions at Nuremberg, has coalesced into the 
current rule of international law. 
International human rights law recognizes the right to a fair trial. For ex-
ample, the right to a fair trial is so enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights that, although some legal scholars consider it “soft law,”179 
many of its dispositions have achieved the status of customary international 
law. The dispositions of universal human rights treaties, such as Article 14 of 
the ICCPR, guarantee the right to a fair trial. Moreover, regional human rights 
conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the Ameri-
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can Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights protect the right to a fair trial. Thus, based on a wide range of 
rules of international law, the right to a fair trial must be guarantee to all kinds 
of perpetrators, and in all situations, and regardless of the seriousness of the 
crime involved. 
The forgiveness law proposal discussed in Part II of this Article is thus 
lawful under international law because it comports with the norms that inter-
national laws require for a fair prosecution and fair trial of international 
crimes.180 
B. Forgiveness Triumphs over Amnesty 
In the course of a peace process that tries to find ways to end a NIAC, 
there exist warring factions at the negotiation table intensely seeking amnesty 
for the crimes they committed during hostilities. However, with amnesty, 
“prosecutors forfeit the right or power to initiate investigations or criminal 
proceedings . . . .”181 In Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon,182 defense counsel for 
Kallon, a former commander of Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”), argued 
that the granting of amnesty to the RUF leadership was the prize for peace 
between the government of Sierra Leone and RUF to end almost ten years of 
brutal conflict. In Chile, the Pinochet administration issued amnesties to pre-
vent “any prosecution in relation to human rights abuses committed since the 
time of the 1973 coup.”183 Cassese says that “[t]he rationale behind amnesty 
is that in the aftermath of periods of turmoil and deep rift . . . it is best to heal 
social wounds by forgetting past misdeeds . . . thereby attaining national rec-
onciliation.”184 On the other hand, pardons forgive punishment once convic-
tion is attained.185 Prosecution and conviction are secured under forgiveness 
regimes. While amnesty laws trade justice for peace, forgiveness laws secure 
justice and peace. Yet, it is necessary to prove the above by outlining the ad-
vantage of forgiveness laws over the disadvantages of amnesty laws.  
Forgiveness laws secure the administration of justice, which is one of 
the most important public goods that any government pertaining to the inter-
national community of states must provide to its citizens. This is true because, 
in order to issue a pardon, a government must fulfill all criminal procedures 
needed to attain conviction of perpetrators brought before its criminal justice 
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system. Although a pardon eliminates a penalty once conviction is procured, 
the recipient of such a pardon is still considered guilty of the crime. In other 
words, criminal investigations, prosecutions, trials, convictions and sentenc-
ing are secured. If any forgiveness legal regime that secures all criminal pro-
cedures necessary to obtain conviction is applied to international crimes per-
petrators, then pardons, to eliminate a penalty once conviction is guaranteed, 
will heal individuals and collective wounds, thus helping national reconcilia-
tion to bloom in the aftermath of an armed conflict. President Andrew John-
son pardoned Confederate officials after the American Civil War, facilitating 
an otherwise almost unworkable reunification in the United States.186 It fol-
lows that some of the benefits that the forgiveness law proposal, discussed 
above, could provide to a country seeking peace are that justice is adminis-
tered, and guilt found, thereby permitting healing and reconciliation.  
On the other hand, amnesty laws impede the exercise of national juris-
diction, thereby endangering the administration of justice, one of the most 
fundamental pillars upon which peace can be erected. Cassese claims that 
amnesty laws “may hamper or put in jeopardy the institution of criminal pro-
ceedings for international crimes.”187 Unlike forgiveness, amnesty laws de-
prive prosecutors of their authority to commence criminal proceedings 
against perpetrators of international crimes. Although it has been argued that 
amnesties can “bring about cessation of hatred and animosity,”188 healing col-
lective wounds by forgetting past offenses, and that amnesty may help broker 
peace deals that end conflict, it is unlikely that amnesty laws heal social 
wounds. Cassese says, “when very serious crimes have been committed in-
volving members of ethnic, religious, or political groups . . . moral and psy-
chological wounds may fester if attempts are made to sweep past horrors un-
der the carpet.”189 
Furthermore, amnesty laws draw in the issue of self-amnesties. Both 
Chilean and Argentinian cases190 prove that “incumbent military and political 
leaders themselves passed amnesty laws, in view of an expected change in 
government and for the clear purpose of exempting themselves from future 
prosecution.”191 Human rights advocates claim that the legal framework for 
peace that Colombia enacted in 2012 can be used “to provide immunity to 
military officials involved in the ‘false positive’ scandal in which Colombian 
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soldiers stand accused of killing thousands of civilians before presenting them 
as guerrillas shot in combat.”192 Therefore, the impediment of the exercise of 
national jurisdiction that amnesties cause and the issue of self-amnesties be-
come seriously detrimental to societies seeking justice and peace in the af-
termath of an armed conflict. 
The forgiveness law proposal guarantees the seeking of the truth,193 re-
dress for victims,194 and compliance with international law. The right to the 
truth195 is embedded in the scope of the right to an effective remedy recog-
nized by human rights treaties.196 Because under the forgiveness law pro-
posal, a government must fulfill all criminal procedures needed to attain con-
viction of perpetrators brought before its criminal justice system, the truth of 
gross violations of human rights will most likely emerge at any of the stages 
of the criminal proceedings, including plea bargain stages. 
In addition, criminal prosecutions are effective in the establishment of 
facts and in the enforcement of the right to information. Because the right to 
the truth is linked to the right to an effective remedy, and the right to an effec-
tive remedy embraces the right to compensation, any forgiveness law that 
guarantees criminal prosecution will assure redress for victims of internation-
al crimes. In France, the fact that the President can issue a decree pardoning 
an individual who has been convicted for committing an ordinary crime does 
not repress the right of a victim to obtain compensation for the damages 
caused by the crime.197 Mutatis mutandis, a pardon granted to a perpetrator 
convicted for committing international crimes, shall not suppress the right of 
victims to obtain reparations for the offenses and damages endured. Any for-
giveness law containing these elements will benefit any society seeking peace 
and justice in the aftermath of an armed conflict. 
In contrast, amnesty laws negatively affect societies seeking peace and 
justice, for such laws put “legal impediments to the exercise of national juris-
dictions,” 198  inhibiting the commencement of criminal prosecutions and 
thereby endangering the rights of victims to an effective remedy, the seeking 
of the truth, and the right to reparation. In addition, international criminal tri-
bunals have ruled that amnesties granted for international crimes as a conse-
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quence of peace agreements cannot be used as a defense to bar criminal pros-
ecution by international courts. In Kallon,199 the defendants filed a prelimi-
nary motion to challenge the jurisdiction of the Special Court of Sierra Leo-
ne.200 The Court held that they had discretionary power to attribute no weight 
to the amnesty granted to the defendants because such amnesty laws violated 
international law and the protection that it provides to humanity.201 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has held that the granting of amnesties to 
perpetrators of torture violates “non-derogable rights laid down in the body of 
international law . . . .”202 Therefore, amnesty laws do not benefit societies 
seeking peace and justice in the aftermath of an armed conflict. Rather, such 
laws prevent justice and the seeking of the truth in societies seeking to heal 
the scars of hostilities, all the while contravening international law.  
IV. FORGIVENESS LAW AND THE COLOMBIAN CASE: THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF A FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR COLOMBIA 
A. Background of the Colombian Conflict 
Since the 1960s, Colombian society has witnessed “the longest-running 
internal conflict in the Western Hemisphere.”203 In the 1960s and 1970s, in-
spired and supported by Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution, FARC and 
other leftist guerrillas204 launched an insurgency war against the Colombian 
government. Over the years, with the rise of drug cartels and other irregular 
armed groups, such as paramilitary units,205 the Colombian conflict evolved 
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into a “triangulated war between guerrillas, paramilitaries and government 
forces . . . ,”206 in which the battlefield or “centre of gravity”207 of the war has 
been its people. In other words, the Colombian conflict has taken place 
“amongst the people.”208 As a result, all parties to the Colombian conflict 
have violated the laws and custom of war or jus in bello209 norms over the 
course of the armed conflict. Guerrillas, paramilitary units, and government 
troops have all committed international crimes (“ICC crimes”) that fall upon 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, specifically war crimes and crimes against human-
ity. 
All parties to the Colombian conflict—paramilitary units, government 
troops and guerrillas alike—have breached the most important principle em-
bedded in the corpus of international humanitarian law: the principle of dis-
crimination, which commands that all parties to a NIAC must always dis-
criminate between combatants and civilians, and attacks may only be targeted 
against combatants, not civilians.210 On the whole, civilians have suffered 
negative consequences of the conflict, given that “one in three violent deaths 
in Colombia [was] the result of the internal armed conflict.”211 Paramilitary 
units “aligned with the government” committed “targeted killings . . . and 
massacres . . . . ”212 Over the course of the war, 218,094 people have died. 
Although nineteen percent of the 218,094 deaths have been combatants, 
eighty-one per cent have been civilians.213 In particular, “socially marginal-
ized youth” have been the targets of extrajudicial killings but were “reported 
as ‘guerrillas killed in combat.’”214 The Office of the Attorney General of Co-
lombia has said that there have been more than 2701 cases of such victims,215 
which is known as the “false positive scandal.”216 
Similarly, guerrillas have perpetrated attacks on civilian populations set-
tled in Bogota, Colombia’s capital, including the 2003 El Nogal Club Bomb-
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ing (thirty-two killed)217 and the 2012 assassination attempt on Colombia’s 
former Interior and Justice minister.218 In addition to the attacks perpetrated in 
Bogota, there are many examples of FARC’s attacks on other towns across 
Colombia that violated international humanitarian law. On June 16, 1996, 
FARC executed thirty-four villagers who worked on a cocaine plantation run 
by right-wing paramilitary groups, an incident now known as La Gabarra 
Massacre. 219  In November 1998, FARC launched a three-day offensive 
against the remote city of Mitu in Southern Colombia.220 Between 700 and 
800 guerrillas seized the town’s police headquarters, leaving fifty-one 
dead.221 On May 2, 2002, FARC attacked a town held by paramilitary units, 
“indiscriminately mortaring and shooting” both paramilitary fighters and ci-
vilians.222 One hundred and nineteen people were killed in the shooting, an 
event known as the Bojayá Massacre.223 On February 11, 2009, in what is 
known as the Nariño Massacres, FARC tortured and executed twenty-seven 
members of the indigenous Awá people who they accused of collaborating 
with the Colombian military.224 Thus, all parties to the conflict have violated 
one of the most important principles of international humanitarian law, which 
is the principle of distinction, since “parties to the conflict have failed to dis-
criminate civilians from legitimate targets.”225 
In addition, guerrillas have committed other breaches of international 
humanitarian law, such as taking of hostages or kidnapping,226 causing “dam-
age to civilian properties,” 227  creating enforced displacement, using 
landmines, perpetrating enforced disappearances, and other gross violations 
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of human rights. Indeed, “Colombia remains the country with the highest 
number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the world,” with more than 
5,712,506 victims of enforced displacement.228 Colombia is also “the second 
highest country, behind Afghanistan, with regard to the number of landmine 
victims.”229 Further, more than 25,000 people have been victims of enforced 
disappearance in Colombia.230 FARC also continues the practice of recruiting 
and enlisting children for war purposes, 231  and reports demonstrate that 
FARC has executed a “widespread use of sexual violence against women and 
girls as a weapon of war.”232 
Because of the international crimes allegedly committed by all parties to 
the conflict, in 2004 the Office of the ICC Prosecutor launched a preliminary 
examination into the situation in Colombia,233 a country that is a State Party 
to the ICC.234 The Office of the ICC Prosecutor stated that Colombian irregu-
lar armed groups, in particular FARC, ELN, and paramilitary units, have al-
legedly committed crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, particu-
larly crimes against humanity and war crimes.235 Similarly, the ICC Prosecu-
tor has indicated that Colombian armed forces have allegedly perpetrated 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, under Article 7 of the ICC Statute 
and Article 8 of the ICC Statute respectively.236 
As the Office of the ICC Prosecutor moves forward with its preliminary 
investigation over the situation in Colombia, peace negotiations between the 
Colombian government and FARC continue in Havana, Cuba.237 For interna-
tional media covering the peace process between the government of Colom-
bia and FARC, the winds of peace will eventually spring from Cuba and will 
rapidly flow toward Colombia, as their voices across the globe proclaim that 
the “ambitious and complex effort” for peace “appears to be reaching a make-
or-break phase.”238 
However, there is an important issue that the parties to the Colombian 
peace negotiation table in Cuba must openly and transparently address: the 
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dilemma of peace versus justice. FARC’s negotiators have said that FARC’s 
combatants will not spend a single day in jail for the crimes they have com-
mitted.239 What is more, current Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, 
has said that, “[i]n the long run, justice cannot serve as an obstacle to 
peace,”240 and that those members of the Colombian armed forces accused of 
committing international crimes must enjoy the benefits of the rules of transi-
tional justice (indirect amnesty) that the legal framework for peace introduced 
in the Colombian Magna Carta.241 Yet, human rights advocates have asserted 
that the Santos administration could use the legal framework for peace “to 
provide immunity to military officials involved”242 in the cases of extrajudi-
cial killings perpetrated by members of the armed forces on civilians, crimes 
which, for the most part, were perpetrated and known in Colombia when cur-
rent Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, was the national defense min-
ister of the country from 2006 to 2009.243 
The legal framework for peace grants the Colombian Congress the pow-
er to issue an indirect amnesty for those accused of committing international 
crimes. As argued above, amnesty trades justice for peace, contravenes inter-
national law, impedes criminal prosecution,244 compromises the truth,245 de-
prives victims from seeking redress,246 and endangers the guarantee of non-
repetition value.247 In addition, the debate among international lawyers on 
this issue has been peace versus justice.248 Nonetheless, this article has pro-
posed an alternative view and has advocated for the position that Colombian 
society must be open to debate public policies upon which a solid transition 
from war into peace can be built. It follows that the forgiveness law proposal 
and the establishment of the forgiveness and reconciliation commission for 
Colombia, which must hold different powers from those ones held by truth 
commissions, can help solve the peace versus justice dilemma that confronts 
Colombia. 
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B. Establishment of a Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission for 
Colombia and Its Advantages over Truth Commissions 
In Colombia, implementation of the forgiveness law proposal should in-
volve the establishment of a Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission, 
rather than rely on a truth commission. The Forgiveness and Reconciliation 
Commission should include mechanisms to secure convictions, to allow for 
forgiveness, and most importantly should include a diverse set of stakehold-
ers with an emphasis on victim voices. This regime is superior to truth com-
missions, popularized in other parts of Latin American, because it promotes 
the values of the forgiveness law and operates within the bounds of interna-
tional norms and laws.249 
Under pardon regimes for ordinary crimes, the pardoning power is an 
executive prerogative,250 where victims do not have a voice at the proceed-
ings leading to the granting of the pardon. Any pardon regime established for 
international crimes, however, must secure victim participation. Victim par-
ticipation can be secured through a society-based or collective body that sets 
forth proceedings leading to the granting of the pardon sought, because the 
act of forgiveness is an individual prerogative that cannot be delegated. Thus, 
neither the Colombian president nor the Colombian Congress alone should 
grant pardons to those convicted of committing international crimes in Co-
lombia. Rather, the power to grant pardons should be vested in a Forgiveness 
and Reconciliation Commission, which would manifest the collective effort 
of Colombia to incorporate and integrate representatives from different spec-
trums of society, beginning with victims, and including government officials 
from each of the branches of government power, envoys from international 
organizations such as the United Nations or other regional institutions of in-
ternational law, and an envoy from the Catholic Church.251 
Therefore, a Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission would hold 
different powers from those held by truth commissions. Unlike truth commis-
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sions, such as the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador252 or the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, among others, 253  the For-
giveness and Reconciliation Commission proposal for Colombia will have 
neither quasi-prosecutorial power nor quasi-judicial power. Whereas most 
truth commissions are empowered to set official investigations units that use 
“fair procedures”254 to determine the facts of the atrocities committed in the 
territory where the commission was established, the Forgiveness and Recon-
ciliation Commission proposal for Colombia will be empowered only to re-
ceive an individual’s pardon application, and to decide, in accordance with 
the requirements established by the forgiveness law, on the pardon sought. 
There are powerful reasons to conclude that a Forgiveness and Reconcil-
iation Commission proposal for Colombia should not include quasi-
prosecutorial and quasi-judicial authority. First, by empowering the For-
giveness and Reconciliation Commission for Colombia only with the task of 
deciding on a pardon petition, Colombian judicial authorities keep their pow-
er to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate international crimes cases. This is 
important in order to build legitimacy and confidence in this crucial state in-
stitution. Second, by adopting this policy proposal, the government of Co-
lombia will avert possible collisions between its judicial bodies and a truth 
commission possibly empowered to launch investigations and fact-finding 
missions and to hold public hearings to hear testimonies of perpetrators, vic-
tims, and bystanders. Third, by pursuing the Forgiveness and Reconciliation 
Commission proposal as described in this Article, the government of Colom-
bia will avoid a conflict of laws between its criminal code and criminal pro-
ceedings code, with the statute of the Forgiveness and Reconciliation Com-
mission proposal for Colombia. 
In contrast to truth commissions, which are generally empowered to af-
ford amnesties as “the price for allowing a relatively peaceful transition to 
full democracy,” the Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission would not 
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circumvent the criminal prosecution process.255 Truth commissions with am-
nesty-granting power have shown flaws that must be highlighted so as to 
avoid legal complications in future reconciliation endeavors. Priscilla Hayner 
says that truth commissions with the power to grant amnesty “are unlikely in 
future truth commissions—or at least” to apply amnesty “to very serious 
crimes.”256 It is legally uncertain whether the ICC Prosecutor will “respect a 
national amnesty granted through a truth commission’s conditional amnesty 
regime.”257 Moreover, Cassese argues that truth commissions holding amnes-
ty-granting powers “have proved unable to bring about true reconciliation.”258 
Even when perpetrators of international crimes have been identified, truth 
commissions holding amnesty-granting power have withdrawn criminal pros-
ecution on such perpetrators “through amnesty laws.”259 The cancellation of 
criminal prosecutions by truth commissions granting amnesty has affected 
“real and lasting reconciliation,” inasmuch as that truth commissions’ practic-
es have “sparked much resentment and anger among the victims and their 
relatives, who desired retribution, or at least ordinary criminal justice.”260 
The Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission for Colombia, in con-
trast, will avoid the legal murkiness of truth commissions and will provide a 
stronger base from which Colombia may begin to heal and move toward 
peace. The structure of the commission is central to achieving this goal. The 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission must exist for a period of four 
years that can be extended up to twelve years; as such, the Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation Commission will align its tenure with the constitutional term 
of four years of both the Colombian President and Colombian Congress. It 
must be composed of twelve members. Four seats must be given to represent-
atives of victims so that they can enjoy their right to exercise their option of 
forgiveness. Each branch of government power must have one seat. Two seats 
must be given to the envoys of the United Nations (one) and the Organization 
of American States (one), thereby allowing the work of the Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation Commission to comply with Colombia’s international obliga-
tion under the UN and OAS. One seat must be given to an envoy appointed 
by the Pope of the Catholic Church; as such, the Pope may be encouraged to 
visit Colombia to help Colombians endorse forgiveness in the country. One 
seat must be given to a representative of the Colombian union, and a repre-
sentative of the Colombian productive sector must occupy one seat, for these 
sectors have been involved somehow in the conflict. The Forgiveness and 
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Reconciliation Commission must have a chairman and a vice-chairman, and 
must be empowered to hire personnel who can undertake different tasks, 
ranging from legal and management endeavors to therapeutic services to vic-
tims and perpetrators. 
Additionally, a written statement of a victim—in which the victim 
acknowledges the application for a pardon made by his or her perpetrator be-
fore the Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission, forgives the offense, 
and accepts the apology, reparation and the guarantee of non-repetition of-
fered—must be a necessary requirement of the forgiveness law proposal for 
Colombia to include in its regime. Without the written statement, the pardon’s 
application must be rejected. Each convicted perpetrator must have the oppor-
tunity to seek his or her victim’s pardon, since criminal responsibility is solely 
individual. Thus, each victim must be the only person empowered to express 
his or her forgiveness for the convicted perpetrator, whose pardon can be re-
voked by judicial decision at any time if such a convicted perpetrator com-
mits a criminal offense under Colombian law, or to deny it during the process 
of reconciliation.  
CONCLUSION 
The legal framework for peace, which the Colombian Congress passed 
in 2012, essentially provided amnesty for those accused of international 
crimes. However, the Colombian Congress can use the legal framework for 
peace to provide both government officials, including military officers, and 
FARC immunity for the international crimes they have allegedly committed. 
While the legal framework for amnesty trades justice for peace, the for-
giveness law proposal would secure justice and peace together. Unlike am-
nesty, the forgiveness law proposal is lawful under international law, for it 
guarantees prosecution of international crimes, discovery of the truth, a fair 
trial, adjudication of individual criminal responsibility, redress for victims, 
guarantees of non-repetition, and mercy for perpetrators. Under the proposal, 
victims—through a Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission—actively 
participate in the legal proceedings that lead to the granting of a pardon be-
cause the act of forgiveness is an individual prerogative that only victims en-
joy. As such, societies seeking healing of the scars of conflict, death and deso-
lation, would achieve peace and justice. 
